Unexpected DMARC Reports Flood emvdmarc[.]com After Domain Acquisition
December 1, 2025
After acquiring emvdmarc[.]com, DMARC reports from 12 unrelated organizations started arriving, highlighting potential misconfigurations or routing issues.
![Unexpected DMARC Reports Flood emvdmarc[.]com After Domain Acquisition](https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/695315a1fd97d7d434c05570/6964a218ac9edf495cc73480_Unexpected%20DMARC%20Reports%20Flood%20emvdmarc%5B.%5Dcom%20After%20Domain%20Acquisition.webp)
After acquiring emvdmarc[.]com, DMARC reports from 12 unrelated organizations started arriving, highlighting potential misconfigurations or routing issues.
We recently purchased the domain emvdmarc[.]com, and after configuring a catch all mailbox, we started receiving DMARC aggregate reports for random domains.
Within a few days, we received reports for 12 organizations, and we haven’t been able to determine who previously owned emvdmarc[.]com AND why email addresses under this domain are still being used as reporting endpoints.
BECAUSE none of the domains whose reports we’re receiving list an @emvdmarc[.]com address in their current DMARC policy.
My guess is that some routing rules are still in place, causing certain reporters to forward DMARC XML to @emvdmarc[.]com. But the question is why only a subset of reporters continue sending reports to these addresses.
If anyone can help identify & tag the previous owner or if you can share this post to help surface the right contact, we're happy to facilitate the domain transfer back to the appropriate party.
